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Abstract—Cloud computing enables users (clients) to out-
source large volume of their data to cloud servers. Secure
distributed cloud storage schemes ensure that multiple servers
store these data in a reliable and untampered fashion. We
propose an idea to construct such a scheme for static data by
encoding data blocks (using error-correcting codes) and then
attaching authentication information (tags) to these encoded
blocks. We identify some challenges while extending this idea
to accommodate append-only data. Then, we propose our secure
distributed cloud storage scheme for append-only data that
addresses the challenges efficiently. The main advantage of our
scheme is that it enables the servers to update the parity blocks
themselves. Moreover, the client need not download any data (or
parity) block to update the tags of the modified parity blocks
residing on the servers. Finally, we analyze the security and
performance of our scheme.
Keywords—Cloud computing; distributed storage; proofs of
retrievability; append-only data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud service providers offer storage outsourcing facility
to their users (clients) who can upload large amount of data
to the cloud servers and can later read their data as often as
needed. However, as a client (data owner) stores only some
metadata for the data file she uploads, the file might get
corrupted at the cloud servers, thus making it unavailable at
some point of time. Moreover, a malicious cloud server can
delete some of the client’s data to save space and still claim
that it has stored the data properly. Secure cloud storage
schemes address this problem where the client (or a third
party auditor) checks the availability of the file uploaded on
the remote server. These schemes typically use concepts of
provable data possession (PDP) and proofs of retrievability
(POR) that are introduced by Ateniese et al. [1] and Juels and
Kaliski [2], respectively. Such schemes employ an auditing
mechanism where the client executes a challenge-response
protocol (with the remote server) to check the integrity of
her outsourced data. Due to involvement of error-correcting
codes (ECCs), POR schemes are less efficient than PDP
schemes in general. However, POR schemes preserve the
integrity of all of the client’s data.
Storage servers in practice storage servers are prone to
adversarial corruptions and hardware outages [3], [4], [5].
Therefore, the client’s data are often distributed to multiple
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storage servers in order to increase the degree of reliabil-
ity. Error-correcting codes are used extensively to design
distributed storage systems as they provide optimal storage
overhead to achieve the same reliability compared to other
techniques [6], [7]. Schwarz and Miller [8] exploit algebraic
signatures along with error-correcting codes to construct a
secure distributed storage, where data blocks in random
locations (of the client’s data) are checked for integrity.
Algebraic signatures can be aggregated into a single signature
that reduces the communication overhead significantly.
Bowers et al. [9] propose a secure distributed cloud storage
scheme called HAIL (high-availability and integrity layer for
cloud storage) that achieves POR guarantees. Encoding of
the data blocks of a file is done in two steps: across multiple
servers (dispersal code) and within each server (server code).
HAIL enjoys several benefits such as: high reliability, low
per-server computation and bandwidth (comparable to single-
server POR schemes) and strong adversarial model. More-
over, message authentication codes (MACs) are embedded
in the parity blocks — that reduces the storage overhead
on the servers. However, HAIL deals with static data (that
cannot be modified once uploaded to the servers). Extending
HAIL for dynamic data is left as a future work in [9].
Although generic dynamic data (supporting arbitrary inser-
tions, deletions and modifications) are useful, append-only
data find numerous applications as well. These primarily
include archival data from different sources where data are
appended to the existing datasets. For example, data obtained
from closed circuit television camera, monetary transactions
in banks, medical history of a patient — all must be kept
intact with append being the only possible update. Append-
only data are also useful for maintaining other log structures
(e.g., in certificate transparency schemes [10]). Extending
HAIL to support append-only data requires the client to
download all the parity blocks making the scheme inefficient
(this is discussed in Section VIII).
Our Contribution Our contributions in this work are sum-
marized as follows.
• We propose a secure distributed cloud storage scheme
for static data that borrows the basic storage structure
from HAIL. Our scheme offers POR guarantees. We
define a security model for distributed cloud storage
schemes. Unlike HAIL, an adversary in our scheme can-
not modify a dispersal codeword without being detected
by the client.
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2• We extend our scheme for static data to accommodate
append-only data.
• In our scheme for append-only data, individual servers
can update their parity blocks (required for an append)
without any intervention of the client.
• For an append, the client in our scheme need not
download any parity (or data) block to recompute the
authentication tags corresponding to the (updated) parity
blocks. She can only send the relevant changes in these
tags to the corresponding servers.
• We use systematic Cauchy Reed-Solomon codes in our
scheme for static data and propose a technique to extend
such codes to accommodate new symbols appended
to the existing message symbols. The corresponding
updates on the parity symbols do not touch existing mes-
sage symbols. The construction of such an extendable
code might be useful in other applications as well.
• We provide a prototype implementation of our scheme
for append-only data and report the experimental results.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
Let λ be the security parameter. An algorithm A(1λ) is a
probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm if its running
time is polynomial in λ and its output is a random variable
which depends on the internal coin tosses of A. An element
a chosen from a set S uniformly at random is denoted as
a
R←− S. A function f : N → R is called negligible in λ
if f(λ) < 1λc holds for all positive integers c and for all
sufficiently large λ.
B. Error-Correcting Codes
An (n, k, d)Σ-error-correcting code consists of an encod-
ing algorithm Enc: Σk → Σn (encodes a message consisting
of k symbols into a longer codeword consisting of n symbols)
and a decoding algorithm Dec: Σn → Σk (decodes a
codeword to a message), where Σ is a finite alphabet and
d is the minimum distance (Hamming distance between any
two codewords is at least d) of the code. The quantity kn
is called the rate of the code. An (n, k, d)Σ-error-correcting
code can tolerate up to
⌊
d−1
2
⌋
errors and d − 1 erasures.
If d = n − k + 1, we call the code a maximum distance
separable (MDS) code. We often specify the parameters of
an MDS code by denoting it as an (n, k)-MDS code, where
Σ is implicit and the minimum distance d = n − k + 1.
Reed-Solomon codes [11] and their extensions are examples
of non-trivial linear MDS codes.
Let the message consist of k symbols m1,m2, . . . ,mk
from a finite field F (considered as a column vector of
dimension k). Then, the classical Reed-Solomon coding
employs an n × k Vandermonde matrix as the distribution
matrix over F. For encoding, the message vector is multiplied
with the distribution matrix to obtain another column vector
(codeword) consisting of n symbols m′1,m
′
2, . . . ,m
′
n from
F as shown in Fig. 1(a). Moreover, if the code is systematic,
the first k symbols of the codeword are same as the k
symbols of the message. As any k × k submatrix of the
Vandermonde matrix is invertible, the original message can
be decoded using any k out of the n symbols of the codeword
(for a Reed-Solomon erasure code). Fig. 1(b) shows this
decoding procedure, where i1, i2, . . . , ik are the indices of
the k symbols available from the codeword.
Fig. 1: (a) For Reed-Solomon encoding, a codeword of n (= k+s) symbols
is obtained by multiplying a message vector of dimension k with the n×k
distribution matrix. For a systematic code, m′i = mi for all i ∈ [1, k]. (b)
For up to n− k erasures, the original message vector is decoded from any
k available symbols of the codeword.
III. RELATED WORK
Ateniese et al. [1] introduce the notion of provable data
possession (PDP) for static data. In a PDP scheme, the client
computes an authentication tag (e.g., message authentication
code) for each block of her data file and uploads the file
along with the authentication tags. During an audit protocol,
the client samples a predefined number of random block-
indices and sends them to the server (challenge phase).
The cardinality of the challenge set is typically taken to be
O(λ), where λ is the security parameter. Depending upon
the challenge, the server does some computations over the
stored data and sends a proof to the client (response phase).
Finally, the client checks the integrity of her data based on
this proof (verification phase). Almost all data blocks can be
retrieved from a (possibly malicious) server passing an audit
with a non-negligible probability. Other PDP schemes (for
static or dynamic data) include [12], [13], [14], [15].
Juels and Kaliski [2] introduce proofs of retrievability
(POR) for static data (Naor and Rothblum [16] give a similar
idea for sublinear authenticators). According to Shacham and
Waters [17], the retrievability guarantee for all data blocks of
the outsourced file can be achieved by encoding the original
file with an error-correcting code before authenticating (and
uploading) the blocks of the encoded file. Due to the redun-
dancy added to the data blocks, the server has to delete or
modify a considerable number of blocks to actually delete or
modify a data block which makes it difficult for the server to
pass an audit. Other POR schemes include [18], [19], [20],
[21], [22], [23].
Curtmola et al. [24] and Zhu et al. [25] propose two PDP
schemes where the client disseminates her data among mul-
tiple servers. Dimakis et al. [26] introduce network coding in
the context of distributed storage systems in order to reduce
the repair bandwidth. For such a distributed storage system,
there are schemes for remote integrity checking [27], [28].
However, network coding is not systematic (i.e., a codeword
does not include the input message symbols) that makes these
schemes mostly suitable for archival data (with less frequent
reads). On the other hand, many distributed storage systems
are based on error-correcting codes [6], [8], [9]. Moreover,
3reads are quite efficient for systematic variants of these codes.
IV. ERROR-CORRECTING CODES USED IN OUR
CONSTRUCTIONS
In our constructions of a secure distributed cloud storage,
we use Cauchy Reed-Solomon coding that is a variant of
the Reed-Solomon coding. In this section, we briefly discuss
Cauchy Reed-Solomon codes over the finite field Zp for a
prime p. Then, we discuss how to extend a Cauchy Reed-
Solomon distribution matrix to accommodate new message
symbols appended to the end of current symbols.
A. Cauchy Reed-Solomon Code
For an (n, k)-Cauchy Reed-Solomon (CRS) code [29], the
distribution matrix is an n×k matrix MCRS over Zp, where
the submatrix consisting of the first k rows is a k×k identity
matrix and the submatrix consisting of the last s = n − k
rows is an s × k Cauchy matrix. An s × k Cauchy matrix
(k + s 6 p) is constructed in the following way. Let X =
{x1, x2, . . . , xs} and Y = {y1, y2, . . . , yk} be two sets such
that the following conditions hold:
• xi ∈ Zp for all i ∈ [1, s], and yj ∈ Zp for all j ∈ [1, k],
• X ∩ Y = ∅ (thus ∀i ∈ [1, s] ∀j ∈ [1, k] xi − yj 6= 0),
• ∀i ∈ [1, s] ∀l ∈ [1, s]\{i} xi 6= xl,
• ∀j ∈ [1, k] ∀l ∈ [1, k]\{j} yj 6= yl.
The s × k Cauchy matrix defined by X and Y consists of
the entries aij = 1xi−yj , where i ∈ [1, s], j ∈ [1, k] (see
Fig. 2(a) for an example). The distribution matrix MCRS
(see Fig. 2(b)) has the property that any k × k submatrix
is invertible. The encoding and decoding procedures for
Cauchy Reed-Solomon (CRS) coding are same as those of
the classical Reed-Solomon coding shown in Fig. 1, except
that MCRS (instead of the Vandermonde matrix) is used as
the distribution matrix.
B. Extending Cauchy Reed-Solomon Distribution Matrix for
Appending Message Symbols
Let an n × k matrix MCRS defined by X =
{x1, x2, . . . , xs} and Y = {y1, y2, . . . , yk} be the distribu-
tion matrix for an (n, k)-CRS code over Zp, where the first
k rows form a k×k identity matrix Ik and the last s = n−k
rows form an s × k Cauchy matrix (n = k + s 6 p).
The codeword is obtained by multiplying MCRS with the
message vector −→m = [m1,m2, . . . ,mk]T , where mi ∈ Zp
for 1 6 i 6 k.
Suppose we have to accommodate another symbol mk+1 at
the end of the message vector −→m. To achieve this, we append
another column to the right of MCRS . If we want to keep
the parameter n unchanged, the number of parity symbols s
decreases; that is, we set the parameters k and s with values
knew = k + 1 and snew = s − 1, respectively. However,
this reduces the number of parity blocks in the codeword
by 1 for every append in −→m that is not desirable. On the
other hand, if we want to keep s unchanged, the number of
codeword-symbols n increases; that is, we set knew = k+ 1
and nnew = n+1 with the restriction nnew 6 p. We describe
the latter case that we use in our construction.
We choose an element y ∈ Zp such that y 6∈ X and y 6∈ Y .
We set yknew = yk+1 = y. Then, we construct an s× knew
Cauchy matrix that consists of the entries aij = 1xi−yj , where
i ∈ [1, s] and j ∈ [1, knew]. We note that all of the entries in
Fig. 2: (a) The 3×4 Cauchy matrix defined by two sets X = {1, 2, 7} and
Y = {5, 6, 8, 9} over Z11. (b) The corresponding 7×4 distribution matrix
MCRS with the first k = 4 rows forming the 4 × 4 identity matrix and
the last s = 3 rows identical with the rows of the Cauchy matrix. (c) The
extended 8×5 MCRS defined by X = {1, 2, 7} and Y = {5, 6, 8, 9, 10}
in order to accommodate the fifth symbol appended to the existing message
vector.
this matrix need not be computed afresh. We simply append a
column to the previous s×k Cauchy matrix where aiknew =
1
xi−yknew for every row indexed by i. The matrix thus formed
is indeed a Cauchy matrix as it satisfies all the conditions
mentioned in Section IV-A. Finally, this matrix is appended
to the identity matrix Ik+1 to obtain the updated distribution
matrix MCRS . An example is shown in Fig. 2(c) where y is
chosen to be 10 in Z11 (knew = 5, nnew = 8).
V. OVERVIEW OF A SECURE DISTRIBUTED CLOUD
STORAGE
In this section, we define a secure distributed cloud storage
scheme. The following Section VI describes the security
model considered in this work. In Section VII, we provide
our basic scheme for static data. In Section VIII, we ex-
tend our basic scheme to accommodate append-only data.
The distributed cloud storage structures for static data and
append-only data are shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, respectively.
We assume that there are total n servers the client (data
owner) wants to distribute her data file F among. Out of
these n servers, she allots k primary servers to store the
data blocks of F and s = n − k secondary (parity or
redundant) servers to store the parity (or redundant) blocks.
Let the servers be denoted by S1, S2, . . . , Sn, where the first
k servers S1, S2, . . . , Sk are the primary servers and the rest
are the secondary servers. Encoding (and decoding) of the
data blocks are done row-wise (inter-server) and column-
wise (intra-server) using Cauchy Reed-Solomon (CRS) codes
described in Section IV-A and Section IV-B. Authentication
tags are attached to some of these blocks in order to detect
anomaly when the client audits her data distributed among
the servers. After the client initially uploads her file to the
servers, the lifetime of the system is split into some time
intervals called epochs. In each epoch, a set of servers can
behave maliciously and corrupt the respective storage (see
Section VI for details). We denote by Ft the state of F stored
on the servers in the t-th epoch.
We define a secure distributed cloud storage scheme for
append-only data in Definition 1. The security of such a
scheme is stated in Definition 2 (see Section VI). A secure
distributed cloud storage scheme for static data consists of
these procedures except the procedure Append.
4Definition 1. A secure distributed cloud storage scheme for
append-only data consists of the following procedures.
• Setup(1λ): The client generates her secret key sk. Let
F be the space of file-identifiers such that each data
file is associated with a unique file-identifier from this
space.
• Outsource(F, sk): Given a data file F , the client
chooses a random file-identifier fid R←− F for F .
She processes the file F to form another file F ′ and
distributes its shares to the servers. She stores some
metadata dF for the file.
• Append(fid, sk, dF , t): The client sends data blocks to
be appended at the end of the existing data blocks to
the servers and updates her metadata dF . The servers
perform append operations at their end.
• Challenge(fid, l, dF , t): During the t-th epoch, the
client generates a random challenge set Q of cardinality
l and sends Q to all the servers.
• Prove(Q,Ft,fid, t): Given the challenge set Q, the
servers compute a proof Π and send it to the client.
• Verify(Q,Π,fid, sk, dF , t): The client outputs 0 if Π
is a valid proof. Otherwise, the client outputs 1.
• Redistribute(fid, sk, dF , t, Ft, q): In the challenge-
response phase during the t-th epoch, if the client
detects that the fraction of corruption exceeds q for
some server, the client tries to restore the share of that
server. If this process fails, the file is considered to be
unavailable.
VI. SECURITY MODEL
We assume that a client (cloud user) wants to distribute her
data file F among n servers. She chooses k primary servers
S1, S2, . . . , Sk to store the data blocks of F and s = n− k
secondary (or redundant) servers S(k+1), S(k+2), . . . , Sn to
store the parity (or redundant) blocks. Data blocks are en-
coded row-wise (inter-server or dispersal code) and column-
wise (intra-server or server code) using CRS codes.
After encoding the data file F , the client initially uploads
this processed file to the servers. The lifetime of the sys-
tem is split into some time intervals called epochs [9]. A
probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A is modeled
as malicious (i.e., in each epoch it can corrupt any number
of servers chosen arbitrarily, and it can modify or delete
any part of the storage in any server it corrupts). An epoch
consists of four phases: an append phase (the client appends
data blocks to the existing file residing on the servers), a
corruption phase (A chooses a set of servers to corrupt),
an audit phase (the client challenges the servers via spot
checking) and a remediation phase (the client checks if some
corrupted servers provide incorrect responses above a certain
threshold fraction q). In the remediation phase, if the fraction
of corruptions exceeds q for some server, the client reads
all the file-shares from each server and tries to decode the
original file F .
A. Overview of Security of a Distributed Cloud Storage
A secure distributed cloud storage scheme (for static or
append-only data) satisfies the following properties. The
formal security definition is given later in this section. The
property freshness is applicable only for append-only data
where up-to-date blocks need to be retained by the servers.
1) Authenticity The authenticity property requires that
the cloud servers cannot produce valid proofs during
audits without storing the corresponding blocks untam-
pered, except with a probability negligible in λ.
2) Freshness For append-only data, the client can append
new data blocks to the existing data blocks. Moreover,
as we will see later in our scheme, appending new
data blocks might require updating some of the (parity)
blocks. However, a malicious server may discard these
changes and keep an old copy of these blocks. Thus, the
client must be convinced that the servers have stored the
up-to-date blocks.
3) Retrievability Retrievability of data requires that,
given a PPT adversary A (possibly corrupting a set
of servers) that can respond correctly to a challenge
Q with some non-negligible probability, there exists
a polynomial-time extractor algorithm E that can ex-
tract all data blocks of the file (except with negligible
probability) by challenging A for a polynomial (in
λ) number of times and verifying the responses sent
by A. The algorithm E has a black-box rewinding
access to A. Authenticity and freshness of data restrict
the adversary A to produce valid responses (without
storing the authentic and up-to-date data) during these
interactions only with some negligible probability.
For append-only data, we describe the security game
GAMEA between the challenger (acting as the client) and the
probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A (acting as the set
of corrupt servers) as follows.
• The challenger executes the Setup algorithm to generate
the secret key sk.
• The adversary A selects a data file F (associated with a
file-identifier fid) to store. The challenger processes F
to form another file F ′ (consisting of data blocks, parity
blocks and tags) with the help of sk and distributes
the file-shares to the servers. The challenger stores only
some metadata dF to verify the responses given by A
later.
Each epoch t = 0, 1, . . . , q1 (q1 is polynomial in the
security parameter λ) consists of the following steps.
◦ The adversary adaptively chooses a sequence of op-
erations defined by {opi}16i6q2 (q2 is polynomial in
the security parameter λ), where opi is an authen-
ticated read or an append. Each append request is
defined by a message vector −→m. For each append,
the challenger runs the algorithm Append and stores
the latest metadata at her end. The adversary A can
also initiate qs (polynomial in λ) audit protocols
(challenge-response) with the challenger. During each
audit, the challenger challenges A with a random
challenge set Q, and the adversary returns a proof to
the challenger. The challenger sends the result of the
verification to the adversary for each read and each
audit (i.e., the output of VerifyRead and the output of
Verify).
◦ The adversary A can corrupt any number of servers
chosen arbitrarily and modify (or delete) any part of
the storage in any of these servers.
In each epoch, the adversary A can initiate qs (polyno-
mial in λ) audit protocols (challenge-response) with the
challenger. During each audit, the challenger challenges
A with a random challenge set Q, and the adversary
returns a proof to the challenger. The challenger verifies
5the proof and lets A know the verification result.
• Let F ∗ be the final state of the file after A corrupts
some of the servers. Now, the challenger challenges
the adversary with a random challenge set Q, and
the adversary returns a proof to the challenger. The
challenger verifies the proof and outputs 1 if the proof
passes the verification; it outputs 0, otherwise.
A wins the security game GAMEA if the challenger outputs
1. The security game GAMES for static data is same as
GAMEA, except that append queries are not permitted in
GAMES .
Definition 2 (Security of a Distributed Cloud Storage
Scheme). A distributed cloud storage scheme for static
data (append-only data) is secure if, given any probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary A who can win the security
game GAMES (GAMEA) with some non-negligible probability,
there exists a polynomial-time extractor algorithm E that
can extract all data blocks of the file by interacting (via
challenge-response) with A polynomially many times.
B. Our Security Model vs. HAIL Security Model
We note that our security definition (for static data) is
different from that of HAIL [9] in the following ways.
• In HAIL, the security model is designed in order to
enable the client to decode (by executing the procedure
Redistribute) the original file F from the file-shares
of the servers whenever a server provides incorrect re-
sponses for a fraction above a threshold q . On the other
hand, our scheme for static data provides a guarantee
that the original file can be retrieved by interacting
with a PPT adversary who provides valid proofs with
some non-negligible probability during audits. This is
why, our security model does not require the procedure
Redistribute. However, the client in our scheme can
attempt to decode the original file F using the proce-
dure Redistribute in a similar fashion as described in
HAIL [9] (see Section VII-B).
• In HAIL, the adversary is mobile, and it can corrupt
up to b servers (chosen arbitrarily) in each epoch,
where b 6
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
. HAIL is not secure according to
Definition 2 where the adversary is allowed to corrupt
any number of servers in an epoch. For example, if the
adversary in HAIL could corrupt all of the n servers
in a single epoch, it could replace the whole (row-
wise) codeword in the second row with that in the
first row (which is also a valid codeword). Thus, the
adversary could modify the entire second row and still
pass the verification during an audit. A sequence of such
modifications could make the file F irretrievable at some
point of time.
VII. SECURE DISTRIBUTED CLOUD STORAGE FOR
STATIC DATA
In this section, we construct a secure distributed cloud
storage scheme for static data and analyze the security of
the scheme. Let n (total number of servers) and k (number
of primary servers) be system parameters that are passed
as inputs to the procedures of our scheme. The audit phase
involves the procedures Challenge, Prove and Verify. We
note that the client constructs two distribution matrices
MCRS and M ′CRS to encode blocks of the data file F row-
wise and column-wise, respectively. We denote the state of
F in the t-th epoch by Ft.
Fig. 3: Distributed storage structure for static data
A. Our Scheme for Static Data
Our secure distributed cloud storage scheme for static data
consists of the following procedures.
• Setup(1λ): The client chooses a random prime p of
length Θ(λ) bits. Let f : Kprf × {0, 1}∗ → Zp be a
pseudorandom function (PRF), where Kprf is the key
space of the PRF. The client selects an element α R←− Zp
and a PRF key kprf
R←− Kprf . Her secret key sk is the
pair (α, kprf ). Let F be the space of file-identifiers.
• Outsource(F, sk): The client chooses a random
file-identifier fid R←− F for the data file F . She
divides the file F as {mij}i∈[1,k˜],j∈[1,k], where each
data block mij ∈ Zp for all i ∈ [1, k˜], j ∈ [1, k].
Fig. 3 gives an overview of the storage structure for
F distributed among the primary and the secondary
servers. For each primary server Sj (j ∈ [1, k]), the
client encodes the data blocks m1j ,m2j , . . . ,mk˜j using
an (r, k˜) systematic CRS code to form s˜ = r− k˜ parity
blocks m(k˜+1)j , m(k˜+2)j , . . . ,mrj (with the help of an
r× k˜ matrix M ′CRS where r 6 p). After processing the
blocks of the primary servers, the client computes the
parity blocks for the secondary servers as follows. For
each row i ∈ [1, r], the client uses an (n, k) systematic
CRS code to encode the blocks mi1,mi2, . . . ,mik into
s = n − k parity blocks mi(k+1),mi(k+2), . . . ,min
using an n× k matrix MCRS .
The client computes authentication tags (in a similar
way as [17]) for the blocks as follows. For each block
mij (where i ∈ [1, r] and j ∈ [1, n]), she generates a
tag
σij = fkprf (i, j) + αmij mod p. (1)
Finally, the client sends {(mij , σij)}i∈[1,r] to the j-th
server Sj for each j ∈ [1, n].
• Challenge(fid, l, r, t): During the audit phase in
the t-th epoch, the client selects I , a random l-element
subset of [1, r] and generates a challenge set Q =
{(i, νi)}i∈I , where each νi R←− Zp. Then, the client
sends the challenge set Q to all the servers.
• Prove(Q,Ft,fid, t): Upon receiving the challenge
set Q = {(i, νi)}i∈I , the j-th cloud server Sj computes
µj =
∑
i∈I
νimij mod p, σj =
∑
i∈I
νiσij mod p (2)
6and sends them to the client (for all j ∈ [1, n]). The
responses from all the servers constitute the proof Π.
• Verify(Q,Π,fid, sk, t): Using Q = {(i, νi)}i∈I
and the proof Π sent by the servers, the client checks
whether
σj
?
=
∑
i∈I
νifkprf (i, j) + αµj mod p (3)
for each j ∈ [1, n]. If any of the equalities does not
hold, she outputs 0. Otherwise, the client outputs 1.
• Redistribute(fid, sk, t, Ft, q): During the t-th
epoch, if the client detects that the fraction (with respect
to |Q|) of corruption exceeds q for some server, the
client reads all the shares of the (possibly corrupted)
file from all the servers, tries to recover F (by decoding
the file-shares of Ft) and distributes new shares to
the servers. These distributed file-shares constitute the
new state (Ft+1) of the file. If the decoding procedure
fails (that is, the client cannot recover F ), the file is
considered to be unavailable.
B. Decoding during Redistribution
As we have discussed in Section VI-B, our scheme for
static data ensures that the original file F can be retrieved by
interacting with a PPT adversary who provides valid proofs
with non-negligible probability during audits. However, the
client in our scheme can attempt to decode F using the
procedure Redistribute in a similar fashion as described in
HAIL [9]. We briefly describe this idea of decoding as
follows. In order to enable the client to decode the original
file, there must be an upper bound on the number of servers
b that the adversary can corrupt in each epoch.1 We use
two CRS codes for erasures — row-wise coding (using
MCRS) and column-wise coding (using M ′CRS). If the client
detects, during a redistribution phase, that the fraction of
corruption exceeds q for some server, the client downloads
all the (possibly corrupted) file-shares from the servers. The
decoding procedure works in two steps. In the first step, the
client executes the decoding procedure row-wise to correct
the possible erasures in each row (each of the locations,
where the block and its MAC do not match, is marked as
an erasure). Therefore, the row-wise decoding can correct up
to s erasures. This requirement imposes an upper bound on
the value of b 6 n − k = s (this bound is b 6 ⌊n−k2 ⌋ for
HAIL [9]). If this decoding fails for a particular row (where
more than s erasures occur), then the client proceeds to the
next step. In the second step, the client decodes the column-
wise codeword for each primary server (erasures that could
not be corrected in the first step). The decoding procedure
can recover the original data blocks for a primary server if
there are up to s˜ = r − k˜ erasures in the corresponding
codeword.
C. Security
We have described our security model in Section VI,
and we analyze the security of our secure distributed cloud
storage scheme for static data according to this security
1This bound holds only for a successful decoding during a redistribution.
On the other hand, the adversary might corrupt any number of servers in
order to pass an audit (without storing the challenged data). Even then, the
adversary cannot cheat with a probability more than negligible in λ.
model. We state and prove the following theorem in order to
analyze the security of our scheme.
Theorem 1. Given that the pseudorandom function (PRF)
is secure, our secure distributed cloud storage scheme for
static data is secure according to Definition 2.
Proof. We use Claim 1 in order to prove Theorem 1.
Claim 1. Given that the PRF is secure, authenticity of the
challenged blocks in each server is guaranteed.
Proof. Authenticity of the challenged blocks demands that,
for any server the adversary A has corrupted, A cannot pro-
duce valid a proof during an audit without correctly storing
the challenged blocks (and their respective authentication
information) for that server. Without loss of generality, we
assume that A corrupts the j-th server Sj (j ∈ [1, n]) along
with possibly some other servers, and we prove that Claim 1
still holds for Sj . We refer [17] for the detailed proof. Here,
we provide a brief sketch of the same.
We assume that, if possible, the adversary A can produce
valid proofs (i.e., they pass the verification) during audits
without correctly storing the challenged blocks and their
respective authentication information. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume that A produces a valid (but incorrect)
proof (σ′j , µ
′
j) when challenged with Q = {(i, νi)}i∈I . Let
(σj , µj) 6= (σ′j , µ′j) be the correct proof (that is computed
honestly) corresponding to the same challenge set Q =
{(i, νi)}i∈I .
As both of the proofs (σj , µj) and (σ′j , µ
′
j) pass the
verification (see Eqn. 3), we have
σj =
∑
i∈I
νifkprf (i, j) + αµj mod p (4)
and
σ′j =
∑
i∈I
νifkprf (i, j) + αµ
′
j mod p. (5)
We observe, from Eqn. 4 and Eqn. 5, that σj = σ′j if and
only if µj = µ′j . So, σj 6= σ′j and µj 6= µ′j , since (σj , µj) 6=
(σ′j , µ
′
j). If we define ∆σ = σ
′
j−σj 6= 0 and ∆µ = µ′j−µj 6=
0, then we have
∆σ = α∆µ. (6)
Therefore, the adversary A generates a valid (but incorrect)
proof exactly when ∆µ 6= 0 and Eqn. 6 holds. We note that
α is a part of the secret key sk that is not known to A.
On the other hand, although α is embedded in each of the
authentication tags corresponding to data blocks (see Eqn. 1),
it is masked with the output of the pseudorandom function
(PRF). As the PRF is secure, this masking is computationally
indistinguishable from a random masking — which makes
the values of the tags independent of α. Thus, the value of
α is independent of A’s view.
If we consider a sequence of pairs (∆σ,∆µ) computed
from A’s responses, then the probability that Eqn. 6 holds for
any specific pair (with ∆µ 6= 0) in this sequence is 1/p (taken
over the random choice of α R←− Zp). The probability that
Eqn. 6 holds for a positive number of pairs is at most qs/p,
where qs is the total number of such interactions initiated
by A (see the security game in Section VI-A). If this bound
holds for any fixed sequence of pairs (∆σ,∆µ), it also holds
over the random choices of these pairs (as α is independent
of A’s view). Now, qs is polynomial in λ and p = Θ(2λ). So,
A cannot generate (except with negligible probability qs/p)
7a pair (∆σ,∆µ) such that ∆µ 6= 0 and Eqn. 6 holds. Thus,
A cannot produce a valid (but incorrect) proof (σ′j , µ′j) 6=
(σj , µj). This completes the proof of Claim 1. 
Let us denote by Fj the share of the data file F dissemi-
nated to the j-th server Sj (j ∈ [1, n]). We describe the ex-
traction procedure for (possibly corrupted) Sj . The procedure
works for other servers as well. We define a polynomial-time
extractor algorithm E that can extract all blocks of Fj (except
with negligible probability) by interacting with an adversary
A that wins the security game with some non-negligible
probability. As our scheme satisfies the authenticity property,
the adversary A cannot produce a valid proof (σj , µj) for a
given challenge set Q without storing the challenged blocks
of Fj and their corresponding tags properly, except with some
negligible probability (see Claim 1). This means that if the
verification procedure outputs 1 during the extraction phase,
µj is indeed the correct linear combination of the untampered
blocks (that is, µj =
∑
i∈I νimij mod p).
Suppose that the extractor algorithm E wants to extract
l blocks (indexed by J) of the file Fj . It challenges A
with Q = {(i, νi)}i∈J . If the proof is valid (that is, if the
verification procedure outputs 1), E initializes a matrix ME
with [ν1i]i∈J as its first row, where ν1i = νi for each i ∈ J .
The extractor challenges A for the same J but with different
random coefficients. If the verification procedure outputs 1
and the vector of coefficients is linearly independent to the
existing rows of ME , then E appends this vector to ME as a
row. The extractor algorithm E runs this procedure until the
matrix ME has k number of linearly independent rows. So,
the final form of the full-rank matrix ME is [νui]u∈[1,l],i∈J .
Consequently, the challenged blocks can be extracted using
Gaussian elimination.
Following the way mentioned above, the extractor E can
interact with A (polynomially many times) in order to extract
ρ-fraction of blocks (for some ρ) present in the file Fj by
setting the index set J appropriately. Use of a ρ-rate erasure
code as the server code ensures retrievability of all blocks
of Fj . This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
D. Probabilistic Guarantees
Each of the servers is audited with l random locations.
Due to the use of a (r, k˜)-erasure code as the server code
(see Fig. 3), a server has to delete s˜ = r − k˜ blocks (out
of total r blocks) in order to actually delete a single block.
Then, the server passes an audit with probability pcheat =
(1 − s˜r )l = ( k˜r )−l. The value of l is typically taken to be
O(λ) in order to make pcheat negligible in λ.
VIII. SECURE DISTRIBUTED CLOUD STORAGE FOR
APPEND-ONLY DATA
We start with an idea for possible extension of our scheme
for static data in order to support append operations and
describe some of its challenges. Then, we propose our
secure distributed cloud storage for append-only data that
addresses these challenges efficiently. We note that extending
HAIL [9] for append-only data suffers from two issues stated
as follows.
• HAIL uses an adversarial server code [18] that is
computationally heavy (due to the use of pseudorandom
permutations and encryptions). For each append, parity
blocks need to be decrypted (using a secret key of the
Fig. 4: Distributed storage structure for append-only data
client), recomputed and permuted again (using another
secret key of the client). This requires the client to
download all parity blocks for each server.
• Parity blocks (for the dispersal code) cannot be extracted
from the MACs without knowing the client’s secret
keys. Thus, even if a classical ECC were used (instead
of an adversarial code), the client would have had to
download all such parity blocks (in order to update the
corresponding MACs) for each append.
A. Our Idea for Extension
We assume that the client appends a row of data blocks
at a time, that is, each server gets a block-tag pair during
an append as shown in Fig. 4. The client encodes the new
k blocks into n blocks using MCRS , generates tags for
these blocks and distributes them among the servers. Then,
column-wise parity blocks are updated using M ′CRS for
each server. The client uses two pairs of sets (Xrow, Yrow)
and (Xcol, Ycol) each satisfying the conditions mentioned in
Section IV-A. We note that Xrow and Yrow are fixed unless
we change the number of primary servers or the number of
secondary servers. On the other hand, for column-wise CRS
coding using M ′CRS , the set Ycol needs to be changed as
discussed in Section IV-B. For each server, the column-wise
parity blocks need to be updated depending on the block
newly appended to that server.
1) Challenges: We discuss about some challenges regard-
ing the proposed idea as follows.
(a) For row-wise (or column-wise) CRS coding, the client
needs to store the matrices MCRS (or M ′CRS) to encode
data blocks. Alternatively, the client can store only the
respective Cauchy matrices at her end to reduce the storage
overhead. This overhead can be further alleviated if the
client stores only the pairs (Xrow, Yrow), (Xcol, Ycol) and
computes the required entries of the matrices from them on-
the-fly. However, storing these pairs also requires O(p log p)
space that is exponential in λ as p = 2O(λ).
(b) A scheme following our basic idea discussed above
suffers from the following attack. Let k˜ be the number
of data blocks (systematic part) present in the column-
wise codeword before the t-th append. We fix a row-index
i ∈ [k˜ + 2, r] and a column-index j ∈ [1, n]. Let (mij , σij)
and (m′ij , σ
′
ij) be the block-tag pairs for the i-th block
of the j-th server Sj before and after the t-th append,
respectively. So, we have σij = fkprf (i, j) + αmij mod p
and σ′ij = fkprf (i, j) +αm
′
ij mod p. Therefore, a (possibly)
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α using mij , m′ij , σij and σ
′
ij ; and thus it can later generate
a valid tag on its i-th block.
(c) In column-wise CRS coding, for each server, the parity
blocks need to be updated depending on the block newly
appended to that server. Therefore, for each server, the client
needs to download all the parity blocks, update them using
the updated M ′CRS and upload them (and their corresponding
tags) to the corresponding server. This requires a huge client-
server communication bandwidth.
2) Addressing the Challenges: We describe some reme-
dial measures in order to address the challenges discussed
above.
(a) We note that the elements in Xrow and Yrow belong
to Zp, where |Xrow| = s and |Yrow| = k. We include the
first s elements of Zp in Xrow and the last k elements of
Zp in Yrow; that is, Xrow = {0, 1, . . . , s − 1} and Yrow =
{p − k, p − k + 1, . . . , p − 1}. We can easily verify that
Xrow and Yrow thus formed indeed satisfy the conditions
mentioned in Section IV-A as long as n = k + s 6 p. So
the knowledge of i ∈ [1, s] and j ∈ [1, k] is sufficient to get
the entries of Xrow, Yrow and to compute the entries aij of
MCRS on-the-fly. Therefore, the client need not store these
sets. Xcol and Ycol can be formed using the same technique,
except that |Ycol| varies with k˜.
(b) The client uses a counter ctr. For the initial upload,
the client sets the counter ctr to 0 and computes authenti-
cation tags
σij = fkprf (i, j,0) + αmij mod p (7)
for all i ∈ [1, r] and for all j ∈ [1, n]. For each append, the
client increments ctr by 1 and updates the tags
σ′ij = fkprf (i, j,ctr) + αm
′
ij mod p (8)
only for i ∈ [k˜ + 1, r] and j ∈ [1, n], where m′ij (or σ′ij)
is the value of the updated column-wise parity block (or the
updated tag for that parity block). We note that, for the first
k˜ rows (systematic part), the tags corresponding to blocks
(data or parity) in the servers never get updated (as the only
operation allowed is append in the k˜+ 1-th row). Therefore,
at any point of time, the value of ctr is 0 for the first k˜
rows and the value of ctr for the rest of the rows is the
number of appends that have taken place so far. Let σij =
fkprf (i, j,ctr)+αmij mod p and σ
′
ij = fkprf (i, j,ctr
′)+
αm′ij mod p, where i ∈ [k˜+1, r] and ctr′ > ctr. Now, due
to the properties of a pseudorandom function, the j-th server
Sj (j ∈ [1, n]) cannot exploit the knowledge of σij and σ′ij
to compute the value(s) of fkprf (i, j,ctr), fkprf (i, j,ctr
′)
or α, for any value of i ∈ [k˜+1, r] and for any ctr′ > ctr.
(c) For column-wise CRS coding, each server can maintain
the updated M ′CRS (or it can compute the entries of M
′
CRS
on-the-fly as discussed above) and update its parity blocks
using M ′CRS . This requires no client-server communication.
Each server Sj (j ∈ [1, n]) updates each of its column-
wise parity blocks as follows. Let k˜a be the number of data
blocks (systematic part) present in the column-wise codeword
after the q-th append and mk˜aj be the newly appended data
block for Sj . Let mij and m′ij be the contents of the i-th
parity block (i ∈ [k˜a + 1, r]) of Sj before and after the q-th
append, respectively. The server Sj multiplies mk˜aj with the
i-th entry of the newly added k˜a-th column of the Cauchy
submatrix of M ′CRS (we refer to Section IV-B for details).
Then, it adds this product to mij in order to get m′ij , the
updated content of the parity block. Here, we note that Sj
need not touch any existing data blocks mij (i ∈ [1, k˜a− 1])
to update its parity blocks.
On the other hand, for each server, the authentication tags
on the last s˜ = r − k˜ (column-wise parity) blocks need to
be updated with the latest value of i and ctr (both are
incremented by 1 after an append). We describe the procedure
for updating the authentication tag of such a block for Sj
(j ∈ [1, n]) as follows. Let (mk˜aj , σk˜aj) be the new block-tag
pair to be appended to Sj when the client encodes the k˜a-th
row using row-wise encoding. Let (mij , σij) and (m′ij , σ
′
ij)
be the block-tag pairs for the i-th block (i ∈ [k˜a + 1, r])
of Sj before and after the q-th append, respectively. There-
fore, we have σij = fkprf (i, j, q − 1) + αmij mod p
and σ′ij = fkprf (i, j, q) + αm
′
ij mod p. Let us define
∆σ = σ
′
ij − σij mod p and ∆m = m′ij −mij mod p.
As both the row-wise and the column-wise codes used
are linear codes, it is not hard to see that the content of
the i-th block of Sj (i ∈ [k˜a + 1, r], j ∈ [1, n]) is the
same irrespective of whether we get it by column-wise-
then-row-wise encoding or by row-wise-then-column-wise
encoding. This crucial observation leads us to the fact that
∆m can be computed solely from mk˜aj and M
′
CRS as
∆m = mk˜ajM
′
CRS [i, k˜a] mod p. Thus, we have
∆σ = fkprf (i, j, q)− fkprf (i, j, q − 1) + α∆m mod p. (9)
The client sends only these ∆σ’s for all relevant parity
blocks to the servers, and the servers update the respective
authentication tags stored at their end accordingly. Hence,
the client need not download the updated column-wise parity
blocks to recompute their authentication tags using Eqn. 8.
B. Scheme for Append-only Data
We construct a secure distributed cloud storage for append-
only data that addresses the challenges efficiently (see Sec-
tion VIII-A1 and Section VIII-A2). The procedures Setup,
Challenge, Prove and Redistribute in our scheme for
append-only data are same as those described for static data
in Section VII-A. We describe the rest of the procedures as
follows.
• Outsource(F, sk): The procedure is same as the pro-
cedure Outsource described in Section VII-A except the
following. Instead of using Eqn. 1, the client computes
an authentication tag for each block using Eqn. 7 for
i ∈ [1, r] and j ∈ [1, n]. The client and each of the
servers initialize the values of ctr stored at their end
to be 0.
• Append(fid, sk, k˜, r,ctr, t): Let the client want to
append k data blocks to the data file F during the t-th
epoch. The client increments each of k˜, r and ctr by
1 and updates M ′CRS . She encodes k data blocks (the
row to be appended to F ) into n blocks using MCRS ,
generates authentication tags
σk˜j = fkprf (k˜, j, 0) + αmk˜j mod p (10)
for all j ∈ [1, n], and sends the blocks and the tags to the
corresponding n servers (see Fig. 4). The servers append
the respective blocks (and tags), increment each of k˜, r
and ctr they maintain by 1 and update M ′CRS at their
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blocks using M ′CRS as described in Section VIII-A2.
For each server, the client also computes the changes
in the existing tags by taking t = ctr and k˜a = k˜
in Eqn. 9 and sends them to the servers. The servers
update the tags on the existing column-wise parity
blocks accordingly.
• Verify(Q,Π,fid, sk,ctr, k˜, t): The procedure is
same as the procedure Verify described in Section VII-A
except the following. Instead of using Eqn. 3, the client
checks whether
σj
?
=
∑
i∈I,i6k˜
νifkprf (i, j, 0)+∑
i∈I,i>k˜
νifkprf (i, j,ctr) + αµj mod p. (11)
Correctness of Verification Eqn. 11 For an honest server
Sj (j ∈ [1, n]) storing all the challenged blocks and their
corresponding authentication tags correctly, we have
σj =
∑
i∈I
νiσij mod p [from Eqn. 2]
=
∑
i∈I,i6k˜
(νifkprf (i, j, 0) + ανimij)+∑
i∈I,i>k˜
(νifkprf (i, j,ctr) + ανimij) mod p.
[from Eqn. 7 and Eqn. 8]
=
∑
i∈I,i6k˜
νifkprf (i, j, 0) +
∑
i∈I,i>k˜
νifkprf (i, j,ctr)+
α
∑
i∈I,i6k˜
νimij + α
∑
i∈I,i>k˜
νimij mod p
=
∑
i∈I,i6k˜
νifkprf (i, j, 0)+∑
i∈I,i>k˜
νifkprf (i, j,ctr) + αµj mod p. [from Eqn. 2]
Therefore, the proofs provided by an honest server always
pass the verification Eqn. 11.
C. Security
Security proof of our scheme for append-only data is
same as that in our scheme for static data (described in
Section VII-C), except that the freshness (in addition to
authenticity and retrievability) of data must be ensured for
our secure distributed cloud storage for append-only data
(see Section VI-A). The parity blocks in each server are
updated for each append. We observe that the first k˜ rows
are never updated in our scheme; only the parity rows (i.e.,
column-wise parity blocks for each server) are updated for
an append. If the servers retain the i-th (i ∈ [k˜ + 1, r]) row
of parity blocks with older contents (and tags for an older
ctr value), the client can easily detect this anomaly while
verifying the proof (using Eqn. 11) as the latest counter value
would not match with ctr. Thus, the freshness of data is
also guaranteed in our scheme.
D. Number of Parity Blocks in a Column-wise Codeword
In our scheme, we have kept s˜ (the number of parity blocks
in a column-wise codeword) fixed throughout a series of
append operations in order to avoid inserting rows in the
Cauchy submatrix of M ′CRS (otherwise, each server has to
touch all its data blocks to compute the new parity blocks to
be inserted). However, if the value of s˜ becomes very small
compared to the increasing value of k˜, then the probability
pcheat for a malicious server increases significantly (see
Section VII-D). To address this trade-off, we take a parameter
p in our system (0 < p < 1). If the fraction of parity blocks
in a codeword drops below p, the client adds some parity
blocks to each column-wise codeword to restore the fraction
well above the threshold (during Redistribute).
IX. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We have implemented our secure distributed cloud stor-
age scheme for append-only data in order to measure its
efficiency. We have run our experiments on a 3.6 GHz Intel
Core i5-680 processor. To encode the data blocks of F , we
use the Jerasure library (version 1.2) [30]. Row-wise CRS en-
coding uses the distribution matrix MCRS . We have run our
experiments on total n = 15 servers (k = 9 primary servers
and s = 6 secondary servers). Column-wise encoding uses
the matrix M ′CRS . We use (255, 243)-CRS encoding over
GF[28] and (65535, 65523)-CRS encoding over GF[216].
For PRF calculations, we use a cryptographically secure
pseudorandom number generator (CPRNG) whose seed is
dependent on the index of the respective server and the
particular row number of a block (see Eqn. 7, 8, 10 and 11).
F is split into blocks of size 4 KB. Each of the servers
contains several disks each of size 2w × 4 KB. After filling
a disk, column-wise parity blocks are computed for that
disk. We note that an append at the end of previous data
blocks affects only the last disk in each server. As arithmetic
operations in Zp are expensive, we further split each block
into chunks each of which is of length w bits (w = 8 or
w = 16). Thus, all the arithmetic operations for row-wise
(or column-wise) encoding are done efficiently in GF[2w].
We have run experiments to calculate the time required for
different phases in our scheme. We vary parameters such
as file size |F | (1–5 GB), query size |Q| (100–1000) and
number of failed nodes (1–6). We mention that the reported
timing measures also include the time required for disk I/Os
and reads (and writes) on the disks.
Table I shows the asymptotic performance of our scheme
for append-only data. Fig. 5 depicts the encoding time for
varying |F | which includes the total time for row-wise and
column-wise encodings. In our experiments, we have taken
s˜ = 12 for both w = 8 and w = 16. The encoding time
increases for larger s˜ (due to computation of more parity
blocks in each server code). Fig. 6 shows the tag generation
time for varying |F |. We note that, for a fixed file size, the
number of chunks in each block for w = 8 is greater than
that for w = 16; and for every chunk in a block, the client
computes a PRF value. Thus, the client has to compute more
PRF values for w = 8.
Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 show the time for proof generation (server
side) and proof verification (client side) when the file size
increases. Here, we keep the query size constant (500). On
the other hand, Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 show the time required
for proof generation and proof verification when the size of a
query increases. Here, we keep the file size constant (1 GB).
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TABLE I: Time needed for different phases in our scheme for append-only data (asymptotic)
Encoding time Tag generation time Proof generation time Proof verification time Append time Client-server communication Reconstruction time
(client) (client) (server) (client) (server) (for an append) (client)
O(|F |) O(|F |) O(|Q|) O(|Q|) O(s˜) O(s˜) O(|F |)
Initial encoding of F and generating tags take O(|F |) time as the client has to process all data blocks to obtain parity blocks and to compute their
tags. The computations involved in generating a proof and verifying a proof increase linearly as we increase the size of the query |Q| = |I| (see Eqn. 2
and Eqn. 11). As a server has to update its column-wise parity blocks for each append, it takes around O(s˜) time. We note that the client sends the
row of blocks to be appended and ∆σ values for column-wise parity blocks to the servers (see Eqn. 9). So, the client-server communication bandwidth
needed for an append is O(s˜). Finally, the reconstruction phase involves decoding F from the file-shares of all the servers — which requires O(|F |)
time. Computations involve additions and multiplications in GF[2w] and PRF calculations. In our experiments, we take w = 8 and w = 16 where field
operations are efficient.
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Fig. 10: Proof verification time for different |Q|
We note that generating and verifying a proof take O(|Q|)
computations and they are independent of |F | (see Table I).
As we have mentioned earlier, the client (and the server) has
to compute more PRF values for w = 8 compared to w = 16.
Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 show the time needed for a reconstruc-
tion in case one or more servers fail. We can handle at most
s = 6 server node failures. Fig. 11 depicts the reconstruction
time for different |F | when a single node fails. We report the
reconstruction time for multiple node failures (for a file of
size 1 GB) in Fig. 12. The time for a reconstruction includes
the time for decoding and disk I/Os. Fig. 13 shows the time
required to append rows to the servers.
X. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have proposed a secure distributed cloud
storage scheme for static data that achieves POR guarantees.
We have presented a technique to extend a systematic Cauchy
Reed-Solomon code in order to accommodate new symbols
at the end of the existing message symbols. Computations to
update the parity symbols do not require reading the existing
message symbols. We have used this technique to extend
our secure distributed cloud storage scheme (for static data)
in order to accommodate append-only data where the client
can efficiently append data after the initial data outsourcing.
We have also analyzed the security and performance of our
scheme.
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